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Missouri adopted term limits in 1992 but the limits did not take full effect until 2003 in the 
House and will take full effect in the Senate in 2005. Missouri’s limit is a lifetime limit of eight 
years in each chamber, for a total of sixteen years. Initially the limit applied to partial terms for 
those elected in a special election but the amendment was revised in 2002 to exclude from the 
circulation service of less then one-half a term (i.e. one year in the House or two years in the 
Senate).3 The amendment can be found in article III, section 8 of the Missouri Constitution. In 
January 2003, no member of the House had served more than six consecutive years and in 
January 2005, no member of the Senate will have served more than six consecutive years. 4   
 
Those who have written about term limits do not agree about the probable effects and researchers 
have found that the effects of term limits vary significantly from state to state (see attached 
bibliography).  This report draws on legislative data compiled by the Missouri Secretary of State, 
a legislative survey, and interviews to examine the impact of term limits on legislative leaders, 
new member learning and specialization, the role of legislative staff, and evolving lobbying 
strategies. 
                                                 
1 This report is part of a larger project on term limits. Contact the author for the complete study or see Richardson, 
Lilliard; Assessing the Impact of Term Limits in Missouri State and Local Government Review (2005) 37; 177-192. 
2 Dr. David Valentine is an Associate Research Professor at the Institute of Public Policy in the Truman School of 
Public Affairs, University of Missouri-Columbia.  He can be reached at ValentineD@missouri.edu.  Shannon Stokes 
is a Research Analyst at the Institute of Public Policy.  She can be reached at StokesS@missouri.edu.  Dr. Lilliard E. 
Richardson, Jr. is an Associate Professor at the Institute of Public Policy in the Truman School of Public Affairs, 
University of Missouri-Columbia.  He can be reached at RichardsonLE@missouri.edu. 
3 Until 2002, the Amendment applied to anyone “elected or appointed to the General Assembly”, suggesting that the 
drafters were unaware that legislators cannot be appointed in Missouri. 
4 In fact only two sitting Senators have six years experience. One was elected State Treasurer and the other has 
announced that he will resign in January. When these two Senators leave, no Senator will have more than four years 
experience. 
 
 
Legislative Leadership 
Prior to the implementation of term limits, legislative leaders were, on average, drawn from 
members with between eight and fourteen years of legislative experience. The eight year term 
limit forces potential leaders to move more quickly if they want to be legislative leaders.  In fact, 
the average tenure of the 2003 leaders in the House was less than four years, or between four and 
10 years less than their immediate predecessors.  One cannot assume, of course, that a leader 
with only four years’ experience is inherently inferior to one with nine years’ experience, but it is 
unlikely that the term-limited leader will have the breadth of knowledge about issues, 
government and governing that he or she would have gained in several more years of service.  Of 
course, the term-limited leader may adopt compensating strategies, including learning strategies 
and staffing strategies, designed to overcome the consequences of inexperience. 
 
Learning and Policy Specialization 
Term limits significantly reduces the time that legislators have to learn the fundamentals of 
government, the policy issues under discussion, and the formal and informal rules of the 
legislature.  In the past, new legislators might attempt to meet the demands of their legislative 
roles both by spending time studying legislation and by specializing in one or a few policy areas.  
Policy specialization, in particular, has long been a principal avenue used to rise within the 
legislature, in Missouri and elsewhere.  Survey responses by Missouri legislators elected after 
term limits suggest that many were not spending a significant amount of time studying 
legislation and were not developing areas of policy specialization, at least when compared to 
veteran members.5  While about one-third of the freshmen reported spending a great deal of time 
studying legislation, less than 4% reported specializing in one or two policy areas.  These 
findings suggest that legislative effectiveness could be improved with an early emphasis on 
specialization.   
 
Staff Role 
Interviews with legislators, lobbyists and legislative staff provided insights into the role of staff 
following term limits.  Most of the individuals interviewed recognized that both the non-partisan 
staff and the emerging partisan staff have more important roles than they held prior to term 
limits. Their roles, however, differ with the partisan and non-partisan staff filling different niches 
left vacant by term limits.  The non-partisan staff provides committee support and assistance in 
the chamber.  The staff knowledge of process is now critical in a chamber where turnover is high 
and tenure is low, making the non-partisan staff the locus of institutional memory for the 
legislature.  The partisan staff fills a different niche.  Members of the partisan staff are more 
likely to be involved in larger strategic issues of importance to the party and to be involved in 
developing and implementing the direction that their members will take on those issues when 
they arise in the legislature. 
 
Lobbyists 
A dramatic change in the General Assembly, such as that produced by term limits, will have 
significant effects on the ability of lobbyists to present their case to members.  Not surprisingly, 
lobbyists are spending more money on behalf of legislators as they struggle to introduce 
                                                 
5 Veterans were legislators with two or more years of experience.  
themselves and their issues to new members.  In addition, lobbyists are making contact with 
candidates, rather than waiting until they are elected, and there are indications that some groups 
are actively recruiting their own members to run for elective office.  The latter trend is just 
emerging, but it certainly makes sense to promote the election of individuals with knowledge 
about a particular issue who will then serve as the expert on the chamber floor.  Finally, within 
the legislature itself, lobbyists frequently find themselves providing basic government 
information to members before they can talk about the issues or programs of interest to them.   
 
Conclusion 
We found that the roles of lobbyists and legislative staff have changed in response to the larger 
number of inexperienced members.  We did not find that term limits had shifted the balance of 
power away from the General Assembly and toward the Governor and state agencies.  This 
finding may reflect the adversarial relationship between legislative leaders and the Governor that 
existed in 2003 and 2004.  It may also be a reflection of the philosophy and orientation of the 
Republican majority, especially in the House.  Although our measures are indirect and 
preliminary, we did not find evidence suggesting that new members have invested more heavily 
in learning about the issues that come before the legislature. 
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